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Abstract
Allen Carlson develops and justifies a doctrine of objectivity in
the aesthetic appreciation of nature by means of epistemology.
This doctrine is quite significant for the self-knowledge of
aesthetic appreciation of nature and the healthy development
of the aesthetics of nature. However, for concepts in
environmental ethics and the requirements of contemporary
environmentalism, another kind of doctrine of objectivity for
aesthetic appreciation of nature is needed, namely, a doctrine
of ethical objectivity, which rests the aesthetic appreciation of
nature on acknowledging the intrinsic value of nature and
respect for nature. Because of this doctrine, appreciators
construe the good of nature as the beauty of nature. They
genuinely apperceive, understand, and experience the
properties and inherent value of nature. The new doctrine of
ethical objectivity for aesthetic appreciation of nature is an
important development to Carlson’s scientific, cognitive theory.
Meanwhile, it’s also helpful to promote the connection between
environmental aesthetics and environmental ethics.
Key Words
aesthetic appreciation of nature; Allen Carlson; epistemological
objectivity; ethical objectivity; intrinsic value of nature

1. Introduction
Cai Yi (1906-1992), a Chinese aesthetician, should be
recognized as the herald who launched the problem of
objectivity in the aesthetic appreciation of nature. In the
1940s, Cai Yi discussed the varieties of properties of natural
objects by means of the concept of “beauty of phenomenon” in
his New Aesthetics. Then in the 1950s, (the so-called “period of
discussion of aesthetics”) and the 1980s, in his revised version
of New Aesthetics, for example, Cai Yi insisted on his objective
position involving natural beauty. He stated:
A landscape is not “a kind of mental state,”
similarly, the image of plum blossom is also not
the token of person’s character. The image of the
object is independent to its appreciator, thus the
beauty of image of object is also independent to
its appreciator.[1]
When Cai Yi puts the question of objectivity about natural
beauty as it relates to natural objects, Western aestheticians
discuss it with regard to aesthetic appreciation of nature.
Because of the long-term neglect of natural beauty and the
notorious art-centered tradition in the West, some
aestheticians even hold that it’s impossible to appreciate nature
aesthetically.[2] Other philosophers, such as Kendall L. Walton,
argue that although we can appreciate nature aesthetically, our
aesthetic judgments of nature have to be subjective or at least

relative.[3] Canadian aesthetician Allen Carlson opposes such
agnosticism and subjectivism concerning the aesthetic
appreciation of nature definitely. He claims:
The fact that nature is natural-not our creationdoes not mean, however, that we must be without
knowledge of it. Natural objects are such that we
can discover things about them which are
independent of any involvement by us in their
creation. Thus although we have not created
nature, we yet know a great deal about it.[4]
Carlson holds that objectivity should be the first doctrine for
the aesthetic appreciation of nature. It should be a necessary
condition for an appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature.
Consequently, Carlson calls for an “object-oriented”
appreciation of nature that is based on our correct and in-depth
understanding of the properties of nature:
It is that to follow the lead of the object and be
guided by it is to be "objectively" guided. This
sense of objective is the most basic: It concerns
the object and its properties and is opposed to
subjective in the sense of concerning the subject
and its properties. Appreciating objectively in this
sense is appreciating the object as and for what it
is and as and for having the properties it has. It is
in opposition to appreciating subjectively in which
the subject - the appreciator - and its properties
are in some way imposed on the object, or, more
generally, something other than the object is
imposed on it.[5]
Then, in the sense of concrete reality, how can we realize the
doctrine of objectivity in our aesthetic appreciation of nature?
First of all, after the acceptance of Walton’s notion of
“categories of art,” Carlson claims that we should apply some
relevant categories concerning what we will appreciate, and
also appreciate the given object with the guidance of correct
categories. Second, in order to implement the doctrine of
objectivity in the aesthetic appreciation of nature, there can be
a right way to ask for help from scientific knowledge, such as
geology, biology and ecology actively. He affirms:
If aesthetic appreciation of natural things should
be aesthetic appreciation of such things as that
which they actually are and if scientific knowledge
is that which tells us what natural things actually
are, then aesthetic appreciation of natural things
should be aesthetic appreciation as informed by
the conceptualizations, categorizations, and
descriptions that sciences such as geology,
biology, and ecology give of the natural world.[6]
For this reason, Carlson’s aesthetics of nature is labeled as
“Scientific Cognitivism”; its core idea is to emphasize the
radical rule of scientific knowledge in the aesthetic appreciation
of nature.
2. The importance of doctrine of objectivity
Given the facts of aesthetic appreciation of nature in the West

and the East, we have to acknowledge that we even fail to
actualize objectivity, such a common sense, which is why
aestheticians need to reaffirm it today. As Carlson notes, due
to the impact of well-developed artistic taste, most
appreciators are inclined to perceive, understand, and estimate
natural objects in their perspective of art or to treat nature as
art in their aesthetic appreciation of nature. Thereby, such
activity, called the aesthetic appreciation of nature, meets the
artistic taste of appreciators.
If the mistake in the Western tradition of the aesthetic
appreciation of nature is to treat nature as a work of art, then
the subjectivity of the aesthetic appreciation of nature in China
is incarnated in the well-developed traditions called “metaphor
and arousal ”(比兴, Bixing), “analogy in virtue” (比德, Bide) and
“emotion expressed by landscape” (借景抒情, Jie-jing-shuqing).[7] “Bixing” is a union of metaphor and arousal.
According to Zhu Xi (1130-1200), a philosopher in the Song
Dynasty, “Bi’ means to make analogy between this item and
that item”and “Xing indicates to talk about one thing in order
to invite another thing.”[8],[9] In full, “metaphor and arousal
”(比兴,Bixing) denotes a kind of artistic approach by which
poets always like to make a metaphor to describe or express
social situations or human emotions by referring to natural
items or phenomena. For example, “Couple of Jujiu birds are
singing in the land of river, beautiful girls are good partners for
young boys.”[10]
Concerning “analogy in virtue” (比德, Bide), we can find words
such as “Gentlemen always let jade along with themselves,
because gentlemen make an analogy between jade and their
virtue.”[11] The notion of “analogy in virtue” mentions such a
custom in China: People like to describe someone’s certain
moral virtues or personalities by natural objects or events. For
instance, “We can find the enduring features of pines and
cypresses only in cold days.”[12] Or, “You are good tree of the
Gods of the Heaven and the Land. You live in the southern land
in settled for the order from the Gods…although you are young,
but you can be my teacher and old brother. Your behavior is as
good as Boyi, so I like to take you as a token of moral
model.”[13] “Analogy in virtue” has become a special view in
the aesthetic appreciation of nature for Chinese people since
the late days of the Spring and Autumn Period (771 to 476
BCE). In fact, it is a kind of aesthetic taste involving aesthetic
appreciation of nature that is quite moralized.
Meanwhile, “metaphor and arousal ”(比兴, Bixing), as people in
the Han Dynasty labeled it, has been translated into a kind of
artistic approach for poem-making that was quite common in
ancient China, namely, “emotion expressed by landscape” (借景
抒情, Jie-jing-shu-qing):
Elements for Ci-making are emotion and
landscape. What we do in Ci-making is no more
than describe scenes in front of our eyes or
express the emotion in our hearts. As soon as we
can express our feelings in our heart or describe
the scenes clearly, we make a piece of good
Ci.[14]
Accordingly, a poem that can combine emotion-expression and
landscape description together very well in one piece was

always ranked as masterpiece:
You stand in the countryside with cloud and
water, you forget your brothers and sisters and
yourself. You keep yourself from cold weather
only by your feather. You do not find white
seagulls in the sea, but only observes fish that are
busy in water. You should jeer at me for my
dreariness, how long my journey is! I only can
find setting-sun as my partner. You swim at the
bottom of flowers that I can not find you, so I only
can be in front of pool in the autumn lonely.[15]
All of “metaphor and arousal ”(比兴, Bixing), “emotion
expressed by landscape” (借景抒情, Jie-jing-shu-qing), and
“analogy in virtue”(比德, Bide), which contemplate nature in the
view of personal morality, share the same essence as the taste
of the aesthetic appreciation of nature. All of them are
humanized or subjectification of natural objects or phenomena.
In essence, the three deviate from the objective position of the
aesthetic appreciation of nature that treats nature in its own
right. The ramifications of such deviation are clear. The
aesthetic appreciation of nature steps out of the center of
aesthetic appreciation. It becomes a kind of tool, a convenient
tool of people’s self-expression. With these approaches, people
express themselves in the name of aesthetic appreciation of
nature. As a result, the aesthetic appreciation of nature is
transformed into human feelings or moral affairs; aesthetic
appreciation of nature exists in name only. Thus we find a
profound contradiction in the history of the aesthetic
appreciation of nature in ancient China. On the one hand, we
witness a tradition of the aesthetic appreciation of nature that
comes forth quite early, lasts long, and is well-developed. On
the other hand, we are shocked by the very opposite facts in
such a tradition where the properties of nature are neglected
and are replaced and overtopped by human emotion and moral
taste. In brief, the above three traditions are typical models of
inappropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature in China.  
The doctrine of objectivity should be the first principle for
aesthetic appreciation of nature. Without such a doctrine, it
would be quite difficult for us to keep the feature of aesthetic
appreciation of nature, to distinguish aesthetic appreciation of
nature from other aesthetic activities, such as the aesthetic
appreciation of art. It is also impossible to be mature and
independent for both the aesthetic appreciation of nature and
the aesthetics of nature.
Philosophically speaking, it is quite difficult for us to protest a
position that is the very opposite of the doctrine of objectivity,
namely, that the aesthetic appreciation of nature can be
irrelevant to the basic facts of given natural objects, and even
can be the very opposite of the facts. For the aesthetic
appreciation of nature, more subjective means better. Or in the
aesthetic appreciation of nature, we can do what we like to do,
anything is always right, and so on. If such a situation is
unacceptable, then, we will have to admit that the doctrine of
objectivity which is put out by Cai Yi and justified and
developed by Carlson should be a universal principle for today’s
aesthetics of nature. It should be an important foundation for
real self-consciousness and the healthy development of
aesthetic appreciation of nature in contemporary life.[16]

3. To accord with the properties of nature: objectivity in
epistemology
Then how can we correctly understand the concrete
connotation of Carlson’s doctrine of objectivity in the aesthetic
appreciation of nature? As soon as the aesthetic appreciation of
nature deals with internal facts of nature, it is necessary for
appreciators to possess correct and in-depth knowledge about
a given natural object in their aesthetic appreciation of nature.
Carlson points out that most of us appreciate nature
aesthetically by relying on everyday experiences or common
sense from our everyday life. It is still understandable for those
who lived before science was well developed; people
appreciated nature aesthetically mainly by virtue of common
sense. However, in modern society, scientific study has made
great advancements. We know the natural world in a richer,
deeper, and more correct way. By contrast, common sense
concerning the natural world that people accumulated in
traditional society seems subjective, unclear, and shallow
today. As a result, if we still settle for the aesthetic
appreciation of nature based on the public’s common sense
about the natural world in their everyday life, then our
aesthetic experience will be quite different from what modern
science describes for the natural world. I think that such a case
should be inconceivable, even insufferable today.
Objectivity is the only principle that we ought to persist in for
our aesthetic appreciation of nature. The right way to realize
this principle, according to Carlson’s view, is through detailed
scientific knowledge of geology, biology, and ecology. Such
special knowledge ensures the correctness and validity of our
aesthetic appreciation of nature and leads us to catch the
internal properties and values of natural objects properly and
deeply. He characterizes it thus:  
Just as serious, appropriate aesthetic appreciation
of art requires knowledge of art history and art
criticism, such aesthetic appreciation of nature
requires knowledge of natural history—the
knowledge provided by the natural sciences and
especially sciences such as geology, biology, and
ecology. The idea is that scientific knowledge
about nature can reveal the actual aesthetic
qualities of natural objects and environments in
the way in which knowledge about art history and
art criticism can for works of art.[17]
According to Carlson’s view, we can find and correct, in effect,
the error that we often make in our aesthetic appreciation of
nature. The first mistake that we often make may be called
“aesthetic omissions,” which means we are prone to neglect
the properties and values that a natural object actually has. For
instance, Cai Yi indicates that although everyone knows that
“red flowers are not independent of green leaves,” in fact, what
we always pay attention to are the red flowers in our aesthetic
appreciation. In most cases, the green leaves of the flowers are
neglected by us just as if they are not there! By means of the
doctrine of objectivity, aesthetic appreciation in which we can
only find the red flowers but fail to pay attention to the green
leaves is not comprehensive. When appreciating the plant
itself, such appreciation is not objective and appropriate

because both the red flowers and the green leaves belong to
the same integrated organism. The red flowers cannot exist for
long without the green leaves. However, there is a kind of
painting of birds and flowers in the tradition of the aesthetic
appreciation of nature in ancient China, the painting of
branches of flowers that prevailed between the Dynasties of
Song and Yuan.
Now let us check the second mistake that we easily make in
our aesthetic appreciation of nature, what Carlson calls
“aesthetic deceptions.” It refers to such cases where, in our
aesthetic appreciation of nature, we like to impose on a natural
object something that it doesn’t have on its own. Examples are
Du Fu’s “flowers weep in their sadness for the time, birds are
shocked by the state of leaving”（感时花溅泪，恨别鸟惊
心。）[18] and Qin Guan’s “emotional peony is tearful, weak
rosebush is lying on morning branches.”（有情芍药含春泪，无力
蔷薇卧晓枝。）[19] In this case, the aesthetic experience
appears to focus on perceiving and enjoying natural objects;
however, the fact is that the custom of heavy personifying
departs far from the facts of the natural objects themselves. As
a result, the aesthetic experience that the appreciator gets
from such appreciation is one that the given natural objects do
not have at all but ones that belong to a human being’s
emotion or taste. By such an extreme personifying, natural
properties are replaced by human taste; finally, we get a kind
of specious aesthetic experience in such an appreciation of
nature. Such inappropriate aesthetic experiences are quite
common in ancient China. However, it seems too strong to
label this model “aesthetic deception” because, in this case,
people do not intentionally deceive others but regard the
personating as a natural event. So, it may be better to term it
as “extrinsic aesthetic attachment.”
The third mistake in our aesthetic appreciation of nature that
Carlson points out is to confuse what nature appears to be and
what nature is. Carlson provides us a typical example of such a
situation. People are always inclined to appreciate whales as
fish. However, science tells us that, in fact, a whale is not a fish
but a mammal. What happens in this case? When we
appreciate whales as fish by means of our experiences of
everyday life, such a mistake indicates that we regard the
appearance of whale as its essence. In other words, we
contradict the features of the whale itself significantly, which
would be a big mistake in science. Then, will such a mistake
cause a notable impact on our aesthetic experience or not?
When we treat whales as fish, a whale appears to be not as
light as most fish because of its huge body. But when we look
at whales as mammals, we see that whales can be quite free in
the water while most mammals live on land and cannot freely
swim in water. Compared with other mammals, whales appear
to be quite nimble and lightsome; as a result, our sense of
beauty involving whales is enhanced.[20]In sum, from the
perspective of Carlson’s scientific, cognitive theory, only that
which makes a distinction between what is true of nature and
what nature appears to have in our aesthetic appreciation of
nature can be an objective, resulting in a correct and
appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature.   
In light of the doctrine of objectivity, the aesthetic appreciation
of nature is the appreciation of nature itself, concrete, an

appreciation of the properties, values, and functions of natural
objects in their own right. Only aesthetic experiences within
this range can be genuine experiences of nature. By contrast,
those that aim at human self-expression under the label of
aesthetic appreciation of nature, in other words, when people
use natural objects as a medium to express themselves, should
be ranked as inappropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature.
Both the tradition of “emotion expressed by landscape” (借景抒
情, Jie-jing-shu-qing) in ancient China and the tradition of
treating nature as art in the West are exemplifications of such
inappropriateness. At least, as aesthetic experiences of nature,
they are not pure and typical ones; at best, they have some
qualities that are relevant to the aesthetic experience of
nature, or a multiplex aesthetic experience of nature.
In sum, the independent and self-conscious aesthetic
appreciation of nature, in Carlson’s view, should be the one
based upon the doctrine of objectivity. Conforming to such a
doctrine, those aesthetic experiences of nature that are
unintentional in contravention of the facts of natural objects,
such as miscalling James, John, is certainly improper. However,
when people analogize natural objects or events with human
moral virtues or to express human emotions in the name of
aesthetic appreciation of nature, they are intentionally violating
the facts of natural objects. It is fair to call such cases
“aesthetic deceptions”: it is the inappropriate aesthetic
appreciation of nature at its worst.    
How can we ensure the independence of the aesthetic
appreciation of nature and the purity of aesthetic experience of
nature? To hold the position of objectivity in epistemology
should be the primary condition. Then, how can we embody the
essential difference between ancient aesthetic experiences of
nature and ones in modern time? How can we transcend the
simplicity of ancient aesthetic experiences of nature and realize
the richness and profoundness of contemporary ones? Carlson’s
scientific, cognitive theory provides us with answers by
introducing the fruits of contemporary scientific studies,
namely, scientific knowledge. With help from scientific
knowledge, our aesthetic experience can be more correct, more
exquisite, more abundant, and more profound than the one in
the past.  
4. To respect the good of nature: objectivity in axiology
However, with the development of environmental aesthetics,
especially, when we try to support contemporary
environmentalism by environmental aesthetics, Carlson’s
theory shows its weakness. It is no more than a type of
objectivity in epistemology. This theory can be applied to settle
the question of how to appreciate nature appropriately, rather
than the question of why we should appreciate nature. Namely,
it fails to ascertain the connotation of the aesthetic value of
nature and explain why the aesthetic value of environments
today is declining. With the turning of contemporary
environmental aesthetics from beauty to duty, environmental
aesthetics is aiming at inosculation with environmental ethics.
These questions are increasingly significant for aestheticians of
environmental aesthetics.   
It is certain that the doctrine of objectivity is right and the
doctrine of objectivity in epistemology is necessary for an

appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature. However, for
today’s environmental aesthetics, it does not seem enough to
possess only the doctrine of objectivity in epistemology. To
answer the above questions, what we should do is develop
Carlson’s theory in detail to introduce primary ideas from
environmental ethics and build a type of doctrine of objectivity
by means of environmental ethics based on Carlson’s doctrine
of objectivity in epistemology.
As an active proponent of Carlson’s theory, Yuriko Saito
supports this theory from the perspective of environmental
ethics. She writes:
The appropriate aesthetic appreciation of nature, I
have argued, must embody a moral capacity for
recognizing and respecting nature as having its
own reality apart from our presence, with its own
story to tell. Furthermore, it requires sensitive
ears to discern what story it may be telling with
its specific sensuous surface, no matter how
unglamorous. I suggested that our attempts to
somehow make sense of natural objects and
phenomena to guide our sensuous experience of
nature toward appropriately appreciating it are by
modifying, enhancing, illuminating, or
transforming its content. Such attempts can be
found in (natural history) science and folk
narratives, which are constructed to give an
account of the specific characteristics of natural
objects and phenomena.[21]
This is a quite special appreciation of Carlson’s doctrine of
objectivity. Regretfully, Saito only puts out a meaningful
keyword, “a moral capacity for recognizing and respecting
nature.” Then, concerning the notion of respecting nature and
why we should respect nature, she gives us no further clear
theoretical account. Remarkably, with the illumination of other
philosophers, Carlson begins to pay attention to such problems
and to tries to talk about the requirements of
environmentalism. However, a deep justification has not been
given by him.[22]
Our misreading of natural objects or phenomena, both
unintentionally, such as treating nature as art in the West, or
intentionally, such as the tradition of “analogy in virtue” (比德,
Bide) and “emotion expressed by landscape” (借景抒情, Jie-jingshu-qing) in ancient China as aesthetic appreciation of nature,
is inappropriate. But the quality of inappropriateness is
changed here. It is not inappropriateness in the sense of
epistemology, namely, untruth or the false; instead, it is rather
a kind of inappropriateness in the sense of axiology. It means
that we do not show enough respect for nature in the context
of human society. For example, if at a party we miscall
someone in front of his or her partner, it indicates that we do
not show respect for the partner in our communication. Then,
when we treat nature as nature, or choose to express ourselves
by natural objects or phenomena in the aesthetic appreciation
of nature, do such events also embody the suspicion that we
fail to show enough respect for nature? If we cannot show our
primary respect for nature in our aesthetic appreciation of
nature, how can we let others believe that we really love
nature? There are too many times when we seem to admire

and enjoy nature, but they are no more than human narcissism
in the tradition of the aesthetic appreciation of nature in the
West and China. The core secret is that we still cannot cultivate
a type of ethical consciousness of true respect for nature in
front of nature. We do not realize that to respect nature in the
ethical sense is the very cultural foundation for our aesthetic
appreciation of nature. We do not recognize that neglecting and
distorting nature is a kind of lack of virtue in morality.  
Then, how can we adequately respect nature? First of all, it is
necessary to reflect on the idea of aesthetic value in the
tradition. In the light of traditional aesthetics, anything
possesses aesthetic value because it meets people’s aesthetic
requirement in certain aspects. Take a flower as an example. A
flower is beautiful because its bright color and unique shape
meet people’s aesthetic need in vision, namely, visual pleasure.
On the contrary, a flower, if it cannot make people experience
visual pleasure, will be not beautiful. Since Kant, modern
aesthetics has tried to make an essential distinction between
aesthetic value and instrumental value, and to justify aesthetic
experience by means of disinterestedness, strictly
distinguishing the sense of beauty and the sense of pleasure.
Formalism can be an exemplification of this as its extreme.
However, such a pure idea of aesthetic value seems still to
justify aesthetic value because of the satisfaction of aesthetic
objects for human need.
For example, Kant argued that the sense of beauty comes from
the formal appearance of an object in accordance with the
collaboration of people’s capacities of perception and
imagination. That is the reason why people can commonly
experience the sense of beauty from a flower. But, the fact is
that it is still a kind of justification of the sense of beauty by
means of utility. The only difference is that he changes the
utilitarianism of practice into one of conception.
Then, how should we consider the aesthetic value of natural
objects correctly on earth? We should start from axiology in
philosophy. In Western philosophy, Aristotle distinguished two
types of good as such:
Good possesses double meaning, one is goodness
of a thing’s 
own, the other is good as the way to
get a thing’s good of its own.[23]
Kant developed Aristotle’s two kinds of good into a couple of
concepts, “end” and “means,” and suggested that a human is
an end:
Man and generally any rational being exists as an
end himself, not merely as means to be arbitrarily
used by this and that will.[24]
Based upon this, philosophers of contemporary environmental
philosophy divide value into two species, instrumental value
and intrinsic value. The former refers to the value of anything
that is available for others. This is a kind of result of being used
by users. Thus, it is unnecessary for the given object itself to
exist as long as usefulness is satisfied. In contrast,
An object has intrinsic value, on the other hand,
when it is valuable in itself and is not valued

simply for its uses. The value of such object is
intrinsic to them. To say that an object is
intrinsically valuable is to say that it has a good of
its own and that what is good for it does not
depend on outside factors. Thus its value would
be a value found or recognized, rather than
given.[25]
Intrinsic value is a core idea for contemporary environmental
philosophy by which we realize that it is a long-lasting tradition
for humans to possess a kind of utilitarian attitude or so-called
anthropocentrism toward nature. Namely, we are inclined to
consider almost all natural objects as a diversity of materials or
means to meet the requirements of human life. In other words,
from the perspective of humans, nature has instrumental value
only; nature is significant only for its value to humans. Without
such intrinsic value to humans, it is quite difficult to justify the
validity of its existence for nature. The story is different today,
however. Philosophers of environmental philosophy tell us that
nature possesses two species of value. One is its instrumental
value, which can be applied by humans; the other is its
intrinsic value, which is independent of human’s interest and
evaluation and serves the being and well-being of nature itself.
For nature, the latter is its primary value, while the former is
external and accidental value. What’s more, the former is
always a kind of disadvantage for the survival and prosperity of
nature. We can take the colorful skin of tigers and graceful
tusks of elephants as examples. So, besides the instrumental
value of nature for humans, people today should recognize the
intrinsic value of nature. This means that we should admit the
rights of being and well-being that are equally shared by
natural things and humans. In other words, we need to realize
that intrinsic value is more significant than instrumental value
for nature itself. Only in this context can humans transform
themselves from a selfish and pure predator in this world into a
kind of moral agency that can be self–disciplined, have the
consciousness of obligation to others, and possess a merciful
heart and virtue. So, recognizing and maintaining the intrinsic
value of nature is the very starting point for respecting,
protecting, and enjoying nature:
Environmental ethics in a primary, naturalistic
sense is reached only when humans ask questions
not merely of prudential use but of appropriate
respect and duty.[26]
From the above understanding of contemporary philosophy, I’d
like to make a special supplement to Carlson’s doctrine of
objectivity in the aesthetic appreciation of nature. It is a new
version of the doctrine of objectivity by means of
environmental ethics. This doctrine recognizes the intrinsic
value of nature, and respects the properties of nature.
According to this doctrine, to perceive, understand, and
experience the properties and intrinsic value of nature becomes
the core of our aesthetic appreciation of nature.
In light of this new doctrine of objectivity, we not only need to
admit that natural objects are not the products of our making
but also to recognize that all of natural objects do not exist for
humans. Instead, they exist for themselves first of all: they are
the end of their own existence. In this sense, it is necessary to

modify Kant’s moral imperative slightly: “never treat nature
merely as a means for us!” This imperative does not only refer
to the fate of natural objects and environments but also
involves human’s conscience, life quality, and the future of
human culture.
From the concept of intrinsic value, the idea of aesthetic value
that is in accordance with the benefit of nature on its own
cannot build upon the foundation that nature meets human
aesthetic requirement but rather is cultivated upon the
condition that humans find and admit the good of nature on its
own and regard the good of nature as the beauty of nature.
According to this new concept of the beauty of nature,
appreciators should perceive, understand, experience, and
bless nature with their sincere and profound sympathy. They
should be happy for the good of nature, sad for the evil of
nature; they should transform the good of nature into the
beauty of nature, regard the rejection of the good of nature as
ugliness. In this sense, the beauty of nature is, in fact, a kind
of life experience to share the same fate with nature. Aesthetic
appreciation of nature, in the sense of the axiology of nature, is
objective; it can step out of traditional aesthetics with its
subjective bias of anthropocentrism to take meeting human’s
good as the beauty of nature and embody human’s caritas to
share the same fate with nature. Only in this context can
humans appreciate the beauty of nature in truth rather than to
entertain themselves by nature. Our aesthetic appreciation of
nature reaches the sublimity of self-transcending.
The deepening and enhancing of our experience of nature
needs our objective attitude toward nature. How can we have
an objective attitude toward nature, and how can we respect
nature genuinely? It means that rather than appreciating and
evaluating nature by means of its benefit to humans or
human’s requirements, we estimate nature’s value according to
the properties and good of nature itself. If the close connection
between beauty and good is still available here, then we find
the beauty of nature. It is not because nature meets human’s
requirement in certain ways, or at least it is not the whole
reason. Instead, it is mainly because we find that certain of its
features satisfy the need of being and well-being of nature
itself successfully. In other word, it is because we find the good
for nature’s own right.  
Concerning environmental ethics, to respect nature is the
precondition for the aesthetic appreciation of nature. Much of
the inappropriateness in our aesthetic appreciation of nature in
light of epistemology cannot be ascribed to ignorance in
science only. Rather, it reflects the unconscious neglect of the
appreciator concerning the independent values and rights of
nature. In brief, we do not respect nature. On the contrary, if
we really respect nature in our aesthetic appreciation of nature,
if we sincerely pay attention to the fate of natural objects and
love nature in earnest, then we will want to observe each
perceptual detail with great passion and eagerly try to
understand its internal features and functions. We will enjoy
their beauty and feel happy when natural objects can
successfully survive and develop; we will worry and feel sad
when they are in misery; and we will be willing to do anything
to improve their situation. In this case, on the one hand, many
improper events such as “aesthetic omission” or “aesthetic

deception” for the neglect of nature in our aesthetic
appreciation of nature will be greatly reduced; on the other
hand, in return, the consciousness of duty to respect and care
for nature can inspire our desire to step into nature,
understand nature, and get more correct scientific knowledge
about nature. In other words, it will promote the doctrine of
objectivity in epistemology, that is to say, to appreciate nature
aesthetically with correct scientific knowledge.
5. Conclusion
It is not enough to possess the doctrine of objectivity in
epistemology for comprehensive aesthetics or environmental
aesthetics. We cannot only be satisfied with the avoidance of
mistakes of scientific knowledge in our aesthetic appreciation of
nature. Rather, we should go further to analyze various
examples concerning the impropriety of scientific knowledge in
our aesthetic appreciation of nature. Then we can find the
moral incorrectness beyond the mistakes of scientific
knowledge. So it is necessary to suggest a new objectivity, the
objectivity of morality. This objectivity asks for a higher
requirement for the aesthetic appreciation of nature: to admit
the intrinsic value of nature, to respect the rights of being and
well-being of nature based upon which we perceive,
understand, and experience nature appropriately.   
The doctrine of objectivity of morality is a significant
development of and supplement to Carlson’s scientific
cognitivist theory. This new doctrine of objectivity surpasses
the view of epistemology and assimilates the core idea of
environmental ethics, answering not only the question of how
to appreciate nature but also the question of what to
appreciate in nature and why we should appreciate it.
The doctrine of objectivity in axiology also is helpful for
environmental aesthetics as a whole. It introduces ethics into
aesthetics and aims at the cooperation between the two. The
building of modern aesthetics starts from the distinction of
beauty and good. Several hundreds years later, we may choose
another way to return to the area of good, to introduce good
into beauty, and to explain the beauty by good. In concrete
terms, for environmental aesthetics that means defining beauty
by the good of nature or the intrinsic value of nature. This is
the right way to deepen the philosophical implications of
environmental aesthetics, to let environmental aesthetics meet
the requirements of environmentalism, and contribute to the
harmony between human and nature alongside the sustainable
development of human civilization.  
The accordance between beauty and good is a very old ideal.
Today, to transform aesthetic taste into duty and to cultivate
virtue by aesthetic taste may open a new land for us.
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